Enhancing the study and practice of Catholic peacebuilding.

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"The CPN is a much-needed way to support the courageous and mostly unheralded efforts of the Church to build peace in war-torn countries from Central Africa to Southern Asia."

Bishop John Ricard
Chairman, U.S. Bishops' International Policy Committee

"The CPN is a space of exchange, encounter and discovery where we help each other understand our peace-work, generated in faith and actualized in history."

Andrea Bartoli
Community of Sant' Egidio,
USA

"CPN is another concrete way of building solidarity among peacebuilders around the world. The energy that it will bring will help us in facing the many difficult challenges of peacebuilding work in our different contexts. My hope is that we are able to bring the same energy eventually to the communities directly affected by war, violence and conflict - creating not only a network of peacebuilders but more imoprtantly a network of communities all over the world."

Myla Leguro
Peace & Reconciliation
Program Manager
CRS-Phillippines

Overview of Colombian Conflict - The Catholic Church's Role in Peacebuilding - Internal Displacement - Human Rights - Social and Economic Development  -  Peace Processes - Education for Peace - Reconciliation - International Solidarity

Brief History of the Internal Armed Conflict in Colombia

Economic inequality, political exclusion, social marginalization and fragmentation and differing ideologies—all have contributed to the four decades long armed conflict in Colombia. Each year around 4,500 civilians perish in the conflict and over 3.2 million people are internally displaced within Colombia.

The roots of the current armed conflict originated six decades ago in a period called 'La Violencia' or the civil war between the factions of the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal, PL) and the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador, PC).  Though the PL and PC reached a power-sharing arrangement as the National Front from 1958 to 1974, this agreement eliminated any other political competition.  This exclusion soon gave rise to repression and by the 1960s left-wing guerrilla movements had emerged to fight for a more representative system.

The armed conflict in Colombia currently involves three main actors:  the government security forces, left-wing guerillas and right-wing paramilitaries.  The government security forces are the military and the police.  The left-wing guerilla movements are largely the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).  The rightwing paramilitary forces fall under the umbrella organization United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).  While all three factions commit human rights abuses, the AUC is considered to be the worst offender. 

In recent years, the conflict has intensified, due in large part to the infusion of new resources—from both drug related profits and more recently from U.S. military aid.  After first taking office in August of 2002 on a platform of increased state authority and security, President Alvaro Uribe won re-election in 2006.  He vowed to crackdown on the violence of the political right and left with his ‘Democratic Security Policy’. 

The Catholic Church facilitated negotiations between the government and the AUC in the Santa Fe de Ralito Accords of 2003 and 2004. The High Commissioner for Peace declared demobilization of the AUC complete in April of 2006.  However, contradictory evidence exists and the International Crisis Group report suggests that some state institutions may have been infiltrated by the paramilitaries and new paramilitary structures are emerging in key zones of drug trafficking. In addition, the guerrillas are taking over the regions where the paramilitaries used to have control. The 2005 Justice and Peace Law (JPL) enacted by Uribe allowed for a framework of demobilization but human rights organizations have argued it allows for increased impunity.

The FARC and ELN scorned the peace process with the AUC because they argue there has never been an incompatibility between the government and the paramilitaries.  In 2004, the Colombian government began ‘Plan Patriota’, a military offensive against the guerillas.  By 2005, the FARC had announced their own counter-offensive, “Plan Resistencia’.  The ELN had engaged in peace talks with the government in Cuba as of 2006.  After a year and four encounters, there has been slight progress.

Information gathered from the International Crisis Group and the Uppsala Conflict Datebase.

For an excellent scholarly review of the armed conflict in Colombia, see the Accord Issue "Alternatives to War:  Colombia's Peace Processes"   especially Fr. Mauricio Garcia Duran's overview of peacebuilding "Challenges and Dilemmas in the Search for Peace."

For an overview of security dynamics in Latin America, see the article "Latin America and the Caribbean: Domestic and Transnational Insecurity" by Arlene B. Tickner.

For an overview of the intersection between domestic security and democratic governance issues in Latin America, see the volume Crimen y Violencia en América Latina: Seguridad Ciudadana, Democracia y Estado  edited by Hugo Frühling and Joseph S.Tulchin.

 

 

 
   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Copyright 2005Last Updated May 2006• Send Feedback